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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
From its inception, the world's first permanent International
Criminal Court ("ICC" or "Court") was envisioned as a body that
would preside over only those cases of most serious concern to the
international community as a whole. Thus, the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction is limited to the international crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.
Moreover, Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute provides that the
Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where, the case is
not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court. This
so-called "gravity threshold" has played a critical role in guiding the
Prosecutor's selection of both situations and cases. In addition, the
first Pre-Trial Chamber to consider the question has affirmed that
Article 17(1)(d) imposes a requirement that must be met above and
beyond the jurisdictional mandates of the Rome Statute. Yet, because
"gravity" is not defined in the Statute, the appropriate scope of the
term remains a matter of substantial debate. The aim of this report is
therefore to review the underlying purpose of the gravity threshold as
understood by the drafters of the Rome Statute, analyze the
application of gravity considerations in practice during the initial
years of the Court's operations, and offer recommendations aimed at
[23:807808
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clarifying both the objectives of the threshold and the factors relevant
to its satisfaction.
A. ORIGIN & PURPOSE OF THE GRAVITY THRESHOLD
The idea of including a provision along the lines of Article
17(1)(d) in the statute of the International Criminal Court was first
discussed as early as 1992. Specifically, the concept arose in debates
regarding the appropriate subject matter jurisdiction of the proposed
Court, which was initially much broader than that granted to the ICC
in the final Rome Statute, leading to concern that the Court could
become over-burdened. The drafters therefore added a provision to
the Statute intended to provide the Court with discretion to decline
the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds of insufficient gravity. The
idea that the Court should have discretion to decline jurisdiction was
also seen as an important method by which the Court could manage
its case load according to available resources. Thus, even though the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC was ultimately limited to
"core" international crimes, the "gravity threshold" was maintained
in the final draft of the Rome Statute.
B. INTERPRETATION & APPLICATION OF THE GRAVITY
THRESHOLD
1. Office of the Prosecutor
The concept of "gravity" has been crucial to the Prosecutor's
selection of investigations to initiate and crimes to prosecute. In
assessing the gravity of a situation or case,' the OTP has considered
1. In the context of the ICC, the Court's operations are divided into two broad
categories: "situations" and "cases." According to Pre-Trial Chamber I,
"situations" are "generally defined in terms of temporal, territorial and in some
cases personal parameters" and "entail the proceedings envisaged in the Statute to
determine whether a particular situation should give rise to a criminal investigation
as well as the investigation as such." Situation in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of
VPRS1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-tEN-Corr,
65 (Pre-Trial Chamber 1, 17 January 2006). By contrast, "cases" are defined as
"specific incidents during which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court seem to have been committed by one or more identified suspects" and entail
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the following factors: the scale of the crimes, the severity of the
crimes, the systematic nature of the crimes, the manner in which they
were committed, and the impact on victims. In addition, the
Prosecutor has made clear that the OTP will generally focus on those
individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court.
Gravity has guided the Prosecutor's selection of situations and
cases warranting the attention of the ICC not only because of the
need to satisfy admissibility requirements, but also as a matter of
policy. Thus, for example, gravity was the dominant consideration
guiding the selection of his first case in Northern Uganda, where the
OTP has investigated crimes allegedly committed by both the Lord's
Resistance Army ("LRA") and the national Uganda Peoples Defence
Forces ("UPDF"), but has only brought charges against the former.
Indeed, the Prosecutor has repeatedly explained his decision by
saying that the criterion upon which he selected his first case in
Uganda was gravity, noting that crimes allegedly committed by the
LRA were much more numerous and of a much higher gravity than
the alleged crimes committed by the UPDF. Gravity has also played
an important role in guiding the OTP's investigations of the
situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC") and Darfur,
Sudan. However, gravity does not seem to have played as dominant a
role in the Prosecutor's selection of cases in the DRC situation as it
did in the context of the Ugandan situation. Rather, after identifying
certain cases as being sufficiently grave to satisfy Article 17(1)(d),
the Prosecutor stressed that he ultimately selected his first case in the
DRC situation based on practical considerations involving, among
other things, the likelihood of apprehending his suspect.
2. Pre-Trial Chamber I
The first judicial interpretation of the gravity threshold under the
Rome Statute came from Pre-Trial Chamber I ("PTC I"),2 which
discussed Article 17(1)(d) at some length in a February 2006
decision. Notably, no other decision of the ICC has addressed the
"proceedings that take place after the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons
to appear." Id.
2. Pre-Trial Chamber I is the panel of three judges appointed to oversee the
pre-trial proceedings in the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
[23:807
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gravity threshold, although it has presumably been applied since
February 2006, particularly given that PTC I expressly held that the
threshold must be met not only in every situation, but also in every
case arising from the investigation of a situation.
In its February 2006 decision, PTC I held that, to satisfy the
gravity threshold: (i) the relevant conduct must be either systematic
or large-scale, and (ii) due consideration must be given to the "social
alarm" such conduct may have caused in the international
community. Furthermore, the Chamber held that the perpetrator of
the relevant conduct must be among the most senior leaders
suspected of being the most responsible for the crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court. Finally, PTC I made clear that, in its view,
the factors identified in its analysis are not discretionary
considerations, but rather necessary conditions for meeting the
gravity threshold.
C. ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Generally speaking, the application of the gravity threshold by
both Pre-Trial Chamber I and the Office of the Prosecutor has been
consistent with the intent of the Rome Statute's drafters, as well as
the overall purposes envisioned for the ICC. Nevertheless, there are
aspects of both the Chamber's and the Prosecutor's interpretation
and application of the gravity threshold that are worth fine-tuning in
the years ahead.
1. ICC Should Consider, When Appropriate, Factors Other Than
Systematicity or Scale & Social Alarm in Analyzing Whether
Conduct Satisfies Article] 7(1)(d)
Pre-Trial Chamber I's February 2006 decision is helpful in that it
provides guidance as to how "gravity"-a term not defined in the
Rome Statute-will be interpreted by the ICC, a court with limited
resources that must focus on those crimes that most warrant
international prosecution. However, PTC I's decision requiring such
systematicity or scale as a condition of Article 17(1)(d) in every case
appears to be overly restrictive. This is especially true where, for
instance, the number of victims would be relatively small in
comparison to other situations, but where the impact was devastating
to the community or country concerned. If one considers the 2001
2008]
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terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, the sheer
number of victims may pale in comparison to other incidents of
violence, but the impact of the attack on the United States was
incomparable to anything the country has witnessed in recent history.
Other factors that could be considered relevant to the gravity analysis
include: the amount of premeditation or planning; the heinous means
and methods used to commit the crimes; the role of the perpetrator in
commission of the crimes; and the vulnerability of the targeted
group. Furthermore, it is unclear why the Chamber has chosen to
look to the social alarm caused by the alleged conduct in the
"international community"; the impact on the community or nation
where the crimes occurred seems a more meaningful standard,
particularly in terms of the Rome Statute's broader goals of ending
impunity and promoting deterrence.
2. Focusing on Senior Leaders Suspected of Being Most Responsible
Is Prudent As a Matter of Policy, but Is Not Required by the Rome
Statute
While focusing on senior leaders suspected of being most
responsible is logical in the context of a limited-resource court such
as the ICC, it is not necessarily required by the Rome Statute.
Indeed, the Rome Statute simply states that the ICC has the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over "persons" responsible for the most
serious crimes of international concern, without limiting that
jurisdiction to any particular class of persons. Moreover, the standard
imposed by PTC I is very strict, requiring that the perpetrator be both
a "senior leader" and among those "most responsible." Indeed, as a
practical matter, one can imagine situations where the objectives of
the Rome Statute would be served through the prosecution of an
individual who might not be described as among the "most senior
leaders suspected of being most responsible." As human rights
groups and other commentators have pointed out, there may be
circumstances under which pursuing those officials further down in
the chain of command could have a significant impact for victims on
the ground.
This point is well-illustrated by the example of "Comrade Duch,"
a former member of the Khmer Rouge who has been indicted by the
Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia ("ECCC") for
[23:807
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crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed at the
Tuol Sleng prison, where thousands of people were imprisoned,
tortured, and killed between 1975 and 1979. Although Duch was not
among the top leadership of the Khmer Rouge, the fact that the
murder and torture of civilians was committed on such a widespread
basis under his authority at the prison renders him subject to the
personal jurisdiction of the ECCC, which includes individuals who
were either among the "senior leaders" or those "most responsible"
for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Pursuing
individuals that are either high ranking or bear significant
responsibility for particular crimes may also, in limited
circumstances, be necessary for the implementation of an effective
prosecutorial strategy in a particular situation-for instance, for
laying the groundwork for cases against those at the very top of a
chain of command. Notably, while the Prosecutor of the ICC has
stated that he will focus on those bearing the greatest responsibility,
he has been careful to acknowledge that, in some cases, the
investigation may have to focus on targets other than the highest-
ranking officials.
3. Distinguish Between the Gravity Threshold and the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion
As discussed above, the Prosecutor seems to apply the concept of
gravity at two distinct stages in determining whether to initiate an
investigation or pursue a particular prosecution. First, as a matter of
statutory obligation, the Prosecutor considers whether the situation or
case under consideration will be admissible under Article 17(1)(d).
Thus, for example, the Prosecutor determined that he would not
initiate an investigation against British forces in Iraq because he did
not believe the gravity threshold was satisfied based on the crimes
allegedly committed there. Second, the Prosecutor, as a matter of
policy, has stated that gravity is one of the most important criteria for
selection of the OTP's situations and cases, as demonstrated by the
OTP's prosecution of LRA forces, but not government forces, in
Uganda.
Two related observations flow from this dual-use of gravity. The
first is that, if the Prosecutor is not careful to distinguish between
considerations of gravity for purposes of determining whether a
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situation or a case is admissible under Article 17 and considerations
of gravity for purposes of determining which situations and cases
will be investigated or prosecuted as a matter of prosecutorial
discretion, the public perception of the Court may suffer. Public
perception of the ICC is inextricably linked with establishing the
Court's legitimacy, particularly in its early years of operations, and
transparency as to how the OTP determines which crimes are
admissible and which crimes will be investigated and prosecuted, are
in turn essential to promoting public confidence in the ICC's work.
Similarly, the public's trust in the work of the Court would likely
be strengthened if the Prosecutor clearly communicated to the public
that, once the statutory requirements governing the admissibility of a
situation or case are met-including satisfaction of the gravity
threshold-the relative gravity of crimes may be one factor among
many that enters into the Prosecutor's ultimate decision to initiate an
investigation or prosecute a case. The need for clarity is illustrated by
recent commentary suggesting that the OTP adopted an
"inconsistent" approach to the selection of cases in the context of
Uganda, where it chose to pursue the "more grave" crimes of the
LRA, and the DRC, where it chose to charge Thomas Lubanga as its
first suspect due to more practical considerations.
Notably, the Rome Statute-like the statutes of the ad hoc
criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as
the practice of many national jurisdictions-allows the Prosecutor
ultimate discretion to choose where to initiate investigations and
which cases to prosecute. Indeed, as a practical matter, prosecutorial
discretion is a necessary tool for ensuring a court's efficacy,
particularly in post-conflict situations, where the number of crimes
admissible before a court will far outweigh the resources available to
prosecute those crimes. Thus, while the relative gravity of a
particular crime may lead the OTP to prosecute one case over
another in one context, it may legitimately be persuaded by other
factors-such as practical considerations, including the likelihood of
apprehending a suspect or the availability of evidence, or strategic
considerations such as a desire to shed light on the "complete
landscape" of events that occurred within a particular situation-in
another context. At the same time, however, the legitimacy of the
ICC requires that the OTP communicate as clearly as possible which
[23:807
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INTRODUCTION
The Rome Statute, which established the world's first permanent
International Criminal Court ("ICC"), leaves no doubt that the ICC is
intended to prosecute only "the most serious crimes of international
concern."3 This language appears in the Preamble to the Statute," as
well as in Article 1. Similarly, Article 5 provides that the
"jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole."6 Finally, the
Rome Statute imposes a "gravity threshold" on the admissibility of
cases coming before the ICC. Specifically, Article 17(1)(d) provides
that the Court "shall determine that a case is inadmissible where,"
inter alia, the "case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further
action by the Court."7 This provision is reinforced by Articles 53(1)
and (2), which state that, in determining whether there is a
"reasonable basis" to proceed with an investigation or a prosecution,
the Prosecutor shall consider, inter alia, "the gravity of the crime. '
As explained in detail below, the gravity threshold has played a
critical role in guiding the Prosecutor's selection of investigations to
3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
4. Id. pmbl.
5. Id. art. 1.
6. Id. art. 5.
7. Id. art. 17(l)(d).
8. Id. art. 53(l)-(2). Art. 53(1), specifically, provides the following:
The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him
or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no
reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate
an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether: ... (b) The case is or
would be admissible under article 17; and (c) Taking into account the gravity
of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial
reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of
justice.
Id. art. 53(1). Art. 53(2), in turn, provides:
If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a sufficient
basis for a prosecution because: ... (b) The case is inadmissible under article
17; or (c) A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account
all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of
victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role
in the alleged crime.
Id. art. 53(2).
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initiate and crimes to prosecute, not only because of the need to
satisfy admissibility requirements, but also as a matter of policy. In
addition, Pre-Trial Chamber 19 has offered its own interpretation of
the gravity threshold, affirming that Article 17(1)(d) of the Statute is
a requirement "in addition to the gravity-driven selection of crimes
included within the material jurisdiction of the Court,""° and setting
forth its process of determining how the threshold is met.
Yet, because the term "gravity" is not defined in the Rome Statute
or any of the other governing documents of the ICC, the appropriate
role of "gravity" in the ICC remains a matter of debate. Indeed,
according to one commentator, "[o]ne of the most contentious issues
to be considered before initiating an investigation or prosecution is
the gravity of the crimes."'' This report therefore reviews the
underlying purpose of the so-called gravity threshold as understood
by the drafters of the Rome Statute, analyzes the application of
gravity considerations in practice over the first five years of the
Court's operations, and offers recommendations aimed at clarifying
both the objectives of the threshold and the factors relevant to its
satisfaction.
I. ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF THE GRAVITY
THRESHOLD
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFT STATUTE
Unlike a number of provisions ultimately included in the final
Rome Statute adopted in 1998, the Article 17(1)(d) gravity threshold
appeared in nearly identical form in the first Draft Statute of the ICC
9. Pre-Trial Chamber I is the panel of three judges appointed to oversee the
pre-trial proceedings in the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
10. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Concerning Pre-
Trial Chamber I's Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of
Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Feb.
24, 2006), Annex I ("Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of
Arrest, Article 58" (Feb. 10, 2006), formerly under seal), 44-45, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-0 1-04-01-06-8-US-CorrEnglish.pdf
[hereinafter Prosecutor v. Dyilo].
11. Ray Murphy, Gravity Issues and the International Criminal Court, 17
CRIM. L. F. 281, 282 (2006). Murphy further asserts that, despite its focus on the
concept of gravity, the Rome Statute provides little guidance regarding how the
ICC should apply its gravity standard. Id.
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produced by the United Nations International Law Commission
("ILC") in 1994.12 Indeed, the idea of including a provision along the
lines of Article 17(l)(d) in the Court's statute was first discussed as
early as 1992. Specifically, the concept of the provision arose in the
context of debates regarding the appropriate subject matter
jurisdiction of the envisioned Court, 3 which was initially much
broader than that afforded to the ICC in the Rome Statute, as it
included both "core crimes" and "treaty crimes." 4 As a result, there
was some concern that, although the Court was "intended to exercise
jurisdiction only over the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community," 5 it could become overburdened by "less
serious cases."' 1
6
12. See Report on the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its
Forty-Sixth Session, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/49/10, reprinted
in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part
2) [hereinafter ILC 46th Session Report] ("The Court may, on application by the
accused or at the request of an interested State at any time prior to the
commencement of the trial, or of its own motion, decide ... that a case before it is
inadmissible on the ground that the crime in question ... is not of such gravity to
justify further action by the Court.").
13. See Report on the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its
Forty-Fourth Session, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/87/10,
reprinted in [1992] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n at 66, 58, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1992/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter ILC 44th Session Report]
(asserting that the Court should "only exercise jurisdiction over the most serious
offences"); see also Summary Records of the Meetings of the Forty-Sixth Session,
[1994] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 25-27, 33, 126, 193, 210, 226-30, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1994 [hereinafter Summary Records of the 46th Meeting] (noting
that the ILC envisioned that the Court would exercise jurisdiction only over crimes
of such gravity for which "there would be a consensus in the United Nations");
ILC 46th Session Report, supra note 12, at 21, 50 (discussing the view presented
in the ILC proceedings that the Court should have "limited inherent jurisdiction for
a core of the most serious crimes").
14. Cf Press Release, Comm. on the Establishment of an Int'l Criminal Court,
Crimes Initially Covered by International Criminal Court Should Be Limited to the
Most Serious, Sixth Committee Told, U.N. Doc. GA/L/3011 (Oct. 31, 1996)
(stating that the ICC's jurisdiction includes "some treaty-based crimes," and "an
initial list of core crimes" including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity); Daryl Robinson, Article 7(1)(a)-Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the
Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 80, 80-93 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) (outlining
the elements of the specific forms of crime against humanity).
15. Summary Records of the 46th Meeting, supra note 13, at 191, 60.
16. See ILC 44th Session Report, supra note 13, at 66, 58 ("In the case of
some conventions defining offences which are frequently committed and very
818 [23:807
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One suggested remedy to this concern was to narrow the subject
matter jurisdiction of the court, namely by limiting the Draft Statute
to include only "those crimes as to whose magnitude and gravity
there would be a consensus in the United Nations."17 U.S. ILC
member Robert Rosenstock offered another suggestion, asserting that
the Court should have discretion to decline to exercise its jurisdiction
in certain cases on grounds of insufficient gravity.18 Rosenstock's
recommendation was noted in the 1994 ILC Yearbook as follows:
The court should be given some discretion in certain circumstances to
decline to accept a particular case on specific grounds-for instance, that
it did not consider the case of sufficient gravity to merit a trial at
international level or that the existing national tribunals could handle the
matter expeditiously. Such discretion on the part of the court might
mitigate the concerns raised with regard to the inclusion . . . of crimes
under national law, such as drug-related crimes and, for that matter, the
"terrorism" conventions .... 19
The suggestion that the Court should have discretion to decline
jurisdiction in cases lacking sufficient gravity gained broad support
among the ILC drafters. The idea was seen not only as a way of
ensuring that the Court limited its focus to the most serious crimes,
but also as an important method by which the Court could manage its
case load according to available resources.20 As a result, the gravity
threshold was included in Article 35 of the ILC Draft Statute
delivered to the United Nations General Assembly in 1994.21 In its
commentary to Article 35, the ILC observed that the provision
broad in scope, it may be necessary to limit further the range of offences which fall
within the court's jurisdiction ratione materiae. Otherwise there may be a risk of
the court being overwhelmed with less serious cases, whereas it is intended that it
should only exercise jurisdiction over the most serious offences, namely those
which themselves have an international character.").
17. Summary Records of the 46th Meeting, supra note 13, at 25, 41.
18. Seeid. at27, 59.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. See UK Discussion Paper on Complementarity 14 (Mar. 29, 1996),
available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/UKPaperComplementarity.pdf
(outlining a proposal from the United Kingdom that would allow the ICC
Prosecutor to decline even prima facie cases under the reasoning that the Court
should not take every case that is under its jurisdiction).
21. See Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court 1994, reproduced in
ILC 46th Session Report, supra note 12, at 52, art. 35.
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allows the court to decide, having regard to certain specified factors,
whether a particular complaint is admissible and in this sense it goes to
the exercise, as distinct from the existence, of jurisdiction. This provision
responds to suggestions made by a number of States, in order to ensure
that the court only deals with cases in the circumstances outlined in the
preamble, that is to say where it is really desirable to do so. 22
Thus, the overall gravity threshold made a distinction between the
existence of jurisdiction, and the exercise of jurisdiction. According
to the ILC commentary, some "members of the Commission believed
that it was not necessary to include [A]rticle 35, as the relevant
factors could be taken into account at the level of jurisdiction .... "23
However, others "pointed out that circumstances of particular cases
could vary widely and could anyway be substantially clarified after
the court assumed jurisdiction so that a power such as that contained
in [A]rticle 35 was necessary if the purposes indicated in the
preamble were to be fulfilled. 24
B. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE DRAFT STATUTE
Upon receiving the ILC Draft Statute, the General Assembly
established the ad hoc Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, which met twice in 1995. During these
sessions, the drafters returned to the idea that the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Court should be limited to a few "core" crimes.
The Report of the ad hoc Committee during its fiftieth session
explains:
As to the scope of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, several
delegations emphasized the importance of limiting it to the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, as indicated
in the second preambular paragraph, for the following reasons: to promote
broad acceptance of the court by States and thereby enhance its
effectiveness; to enhance credibility and moral authority of the court; to
avoid overloading the court with cases that could be dealt with adequately




25. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 54, 55, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22,
U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995).
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international community .... With regard to selection of crimes, a
number of delegations suggested that the jurisdiction of the court should
be limited to three or four of the crimes under general international
law ... because of the magnitude, the occurrence and the inevitable
international consequences of these crimes.
26
ILC members also discussed doing away with the gravity
threshold in favor of limiting the jurisdiction of the Court.27
Nevertheless, the overall "gravity threshold," which was initially
formulated as an alternative to narrowing the prescriptive jurisdiction
given to the Court in the ILC Draft Statute, continued to receive
broad support as the negotiations progressed. For example, in March
1996, the United Kingdom submitted a discussion paper urging that,
"the ICC prosecutor should have discretion to refuse to prosecute
even though a prima facie case against an accused has been
established [and] the court should not be obliged to go ahead with
every case over which it has jurisdiction, or which is not
inadmissible .... ,28 Thus, the gravity threshold was maintained in
26. Id. 54, 55.
27. See, e.g., Summary of the Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee
During the Period 25 March - 12 April 1996, 7 123, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1 (May
7, 1996) (noting that some delegations suggested that, rather than providing for the
"non-gravity of the crime as a ground for inadmissibility... the inclusion of more
detailed definitions of crimes ... would suffice to indicate that the crime did not
pertain to the jurisdiction of the court").
28. UK Discussion Paper on Complementarity, supra note 20, 14, 29; see
also Summary Record of the 5th Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/SR.5,
45 (1998) (recording Croatia's appeal for guarantees that the ICC would "not be
burdened by minor violations" and that cases brought before it be of "sufficient
gravity and significance"). Sweden reiterated that the Court must not only satisfy
that it has jurisdiction, but also that the case is admissible, with sufficient gravity
being a determining factor of the latter. See Summary Record of 10th Meeting,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.10, 18, 22 (1998). Zimbabwe stated that the
gravity threshold dispels the concern that the ICC's effectiveness will be
undermined by inclusion of minor breaches in crimes within its jurisdiction. See
Summary Record of 36th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/C.1/SR.36, 13, 32
(1998). Amnesty International, which commented extensively on the Draft Statute
throughout the negotiating process, also supported the notion that the Prosecutor
should have sufficient flexibility to forego an investigation on the basis of
insufficient gravity, even where the Court possessed jurisdiction. See Amnesty
International, The International Criminal Court, Making the Right Choices, Part
II: Organizing the Court and Guaranteeing a Fair Trial, IOR 40/11/97, § II.B.2
(July 1997) [hereinafter Amnesty International] (stating that "[t]he criterion
enunciated in Article 26 (1) of the ILC draft statute for the prosecutor to decline to
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the draft through the Preparatory Committee's August 1997 session,
and remained unchanged for the remainder of the negotiating
process, even though the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court was
eventually limited to a few core crimes.29
C. ARTICLE 17(1)(D) OF THE ROME STATUTE
As noted earlier, Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute is nearly
identical to the language originally proposed as Article 35.3o Thus, as
aptly summarized in one commentary on the Rome Statute's drafting
history, "the Statute has always had threaded through it the idea of
gravity-that the Court should hear only the most serious cases of
truly international concern."'3' This idea, in turn, seems to have been
motivated by a desire among the drafters that the ICC "be a forum
for trying major offenders, rather than pursuing perpetrators of
isolated acts falling under the Court's jurisdiction. ' 32 At the same
initiate an investigation is too rigid. That article provides that 'the Prosecutor shall
initiate an investigation unless the prosecutor concludes that there is no possible
basis for a prosecution under this Statute.' This could be read to require that the
prosecutor would have to expend finite resources to investigate every case
conceivably falling within the jurisdiction of the court regardless of the scale or
gravity of the particular crimes, the quality of the evidence and other legitimate
factors").
29. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 14 (noting that, when some ICC
Preparatory Committee members raised the issue in 1997, Christian Wenaweser
from Liechtenstein and other members sought to limit the ICC's jurisdiction to
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). The Preparatory Committee
eventually limited the ICC's jurisdiction to these core crimes rather than expand it
to include crimes such as environmental destruction and terrorism. See Decisions
Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Held from I to 12 December
1997, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev. 1 (1997) (limiting the ICC's jurisdiction
to only crimes considered most serious by the international community).
30. Compare ILC 46th Session Report, supra note 12, at 52, with Rome Statute,
supra note 3, art. 17(l)(d).
31. Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal
Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 419 (2000); see also Mohamed
M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement
International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869, 904-05 (2002) (noting that
the statute's attention to gravity "is logical given that the philosophical
underpinning of the ICC-as represented in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble,
and in articles 1 and 5-is deterrence through the threat of prosecution and
punishment of grave crimes that threaten the peace, security, and well-being of the
world").
32. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY
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time, neither the Rome Statute nor the later-adopted ICC Rules of
Procedure and Evidence 33 define gravity, leaving open a number of
important questions as to its objectives and requirements in practice.
II. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE
GRAVITY THRESHOLD WITHIN THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The Office of the Prosecutor ("OTP") was the first organ of the
ICC to interpret and apply the concept of "gravity" under the Rome
Statute, and the Prosecutor continues to refer to gravity
considerations when explaining his office's policy toward selecting
particular investigations and cases over others.34 In addition, Pre-
213 (2d ed. 2001); see also Sadat & Carden, supra note 31, at 419 n.228 ("The
Statute now contains extremely high threshold and intent requirements for the
substantive offenses, indicating an intent to prosecute major offenders (essentially
leaders) rather than followers. This may prove problematic in operation, for in
many cases, particularly if a State's judicial system has collapsed, the ICC should
be able to try more, rather than fewer, participants in mass crimes, hopefully
without being overwhelmed. Achieving this balance was one of the most difficult
tasks of the framers. Understanding the delicate compromise reached is equally
difficult, for the Statute does not address the problem explicitly, but only indirectly
through the concept of 'gravity' and the jurisdictional and material elements of the
chapeaux to the crimes against humanity and war crimes articles.").
33. Sadat & Carden, supra note 31, at 419; Murphy, supra note 11, at 282
(stating that, "[a]lthough the concept of gravity is a central tenet of international
criminal justice, the Statute provides little by way of explanation into what this
means in practice"). At least two states did call for clarification of the term
"gravity" during the drafting process. Venezuela, for example, in its comments to
the Ad Hoc Committee dated March 14, 1995, stated that "vague, imprecise
expressions must be avoided, since they may create difficulties when the time
comes to put the provisions of the statute into practice." Comments Received
Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution 49/53 on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Report to the Secretary
General, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/l/Add. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Comments to the Ad
Hoc Committee]. Later, at the Rome Conference, Chile noted the need to clearly
explain the "vague reference" to sufficient gravity warranting further action by the
Court. Summary Record of llth Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.I/SR.11,
22, 29 (1998). It is unclear from the drafting history why these calls for greater
clarification were not addressed in the final Statute.
34. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Keynote Address: Integrating the Work of the ICC
into Local Justice Initiatives, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 497, 498 (2006) (discussing
the importance, yet challenging character, of gravity in the selection of cases to be
heard before the ICC).
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Trial Chamber I has set forth its own understanding of Article
17(1)(d)
A. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
1. General Interpretation
As suggested above, the Prosecutor of the ICC has treated gravity
not only as a hurdle to satisfying the admissibility of a situation or a
case, 36 but also as "one of the most important criteria for selection of
[the OTP's] situations and cases. 3 7 In terms of the criteria
considered by the Prosecutor in analyzing the gravity of a situation
or case, statements by the OTP have pointed to one or more of the
following factors, some of which appear to overlap:
" the number of persons killed;
" the number of victims, particularly in the case of crimes against
"physical integrity," such as willful killing or rape;
" the severity of the crimes;
" the scale of the crimes;
35. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Dyilo, supra note 10, 44, 45 (interpreting the
gravity threshold provided under Article 17(1)(d)).
36. In the context of the ICC, the Court's operations are divided into two broad
categories: "situations" and "cases." According to Pre-Trial Chamber I,
"situations" are "generally defined in terms of temporal, territorial and in some
cases personal parameters" and "entail the proceedings envisaged in the Statute to
determine whether a particular situation should give rise to a criminal investigation
as well as the investigation as such." Situation in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-tEN-Corr, Decision on the Applications for
Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5,
and VPRS 6, 65 (Jan. 17, 2006). In other words, the "situation" refers to the
operations of the ICC designed to determine whether crimes have been committed
within a given country that should be investigated by the Prosecutor. By contrast,
"cases" are defined as "specific incidents during which one or more crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court seem to have been committed by one or more
identified suspects" and entail "proceedings that take place after the issuance of a
warrant of arrest or a summons to appear." Id.
37. Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 34, at 498; see also Murphy, supra note 11, at
284 (stating that "[c]rimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC are outlined in
Articles 6 through 8 (genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes) of the
Rome Statute, but Article 17 also requires that, in addition, the case must be of
sufficient gravity to justify action by the Court. This admissibility threshold is of
the utmost importance in determining prosecutorial policy").
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" the systematicity of the crimes;
" the nature of the crimes;
" the manner in which those crimes were committed; and
" the impact of the crimes. 38
In addition, the Prosecutor has made clear that, given the "global
character of the ICC, its statutory provisions and logistical
constraints," the OTP will generally "focus its investigative and
prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who bear the greatest
responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organisation
allegedly responsible for those crimes. '39 Thus, as stated in a 2003
38. See, e.g., Luis MORENO-OCAMPO, STATEMENT AT THE INFORMAL MEETING
OF LEGAL ADVISORS OF MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 6 (Oct. 24, 2005),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_20051024
_English.pdf [hereinafter MORENO-OCAMPO, INFORMAL MEETING OF LEGAL
ADVISORS] ("We are currently in the process of refining our methodologies for
assessing gravity. In particular, there are several factors that must be considered.
The most obvious of these is the number of persons killed-as this tends to be the
most reliably reported. However, we will not necessarily limit our investigations to
situations where killing has been the predominant crime. We also look at number
of victims of other crimes, especially crimes against physical integrity. The impact
of the crimes is another important factor."); ROD RASTAN, THE POWER OF THE
PROSECUTOR IN INITIATING INVESTIGATIONS 7 (2007), available at http://www.
icclr.law.ubc.ca/Site%20Map/ICC/PoweroftheProsecutor.pdf (stating that, "[i]n
practice, in determining whether the situation is of sufficient gravity, the Office
will consider issues of severity; scale; systematicity; impact; and particularly
aggravating aspects"); ICC, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES PERFORMED DURING THE FIRST THREE YEARS (JUNE 2003-JUNE 2006)
6 (2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP-3-year-
report-20060914_English.pdf [hereinafter ICC, FIRST THREE YEARS] (stating that,
"factors relevant in assessing gravity include: the scale of the crimes; the nature of
the crimes; the manner of commission of the crimes; and the impact of the
crimes").
39. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the
Office of the Prosecutor, at 7, September 2003, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_PolicyPaper.pdf; see also MORENO-OCAMPO,
INFORMAL MEETING OF LEGAL ADVISORS, supra note 38, at 5-6 ("Experience
shows that the situations faced by the Court tend to involve large-scale commission
of crimes, with an untold numbers of victims as well as many alleged perpetrators.
As a global and permanent institution, the ICC will often be confronted with
multiple situations of this nature . . . we have developed strategies that take into
account the global nature of the ICC and allowing us to handle concurrently
several situations, while respecting our limited resources. One of the most
important elements of this strategy is to focus investigative and prosecutorial
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policy paper released by the OTP, the "concept of gravity should not
be exclusively attached to the act that constituted the crime but also
to the degree of participation in its commission."4 Nevertheless, in
announcing his policy, the Prosecutor was careful to acknowledge
that "[i]n some cases, the focus of an investigation by the [OTP] may
go wider than high-ranking officers if, for example, investigation of
certain types of crimes or those officers lower down the chain of
command is necessary for the whole case."'"
2. Application
The Prosecutor has stressed the importance of gravity when
explaining both his approach to determining whether to investigate a
particular situation and his decisions regarding whether to prosecute
particular cases.
a. Situations
Between July 2002, when the Rome Statute entered into force, and
February 2006, the Office of the Prosecutor had received 1,732
communications from individuals or groups in at least 103 different
countries regarding alleged crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court. The OTP also received 3 referrals from states and 1 referral
from the United Nations Security Council.42 Irrespective of the
source of information sent to the OTP, the Office has indicated that it
conducts an initial evaluation of each communication received to
determine whether there is a "reasonable basis" to proceed with an
investigation.43
efforts and resources on those who bear the greatest responsibility for the most
serious crimes ....").
40. See RASTAN, supra note 38, at 7 ("The global character of the ICC, its
statutory provisions and logistical constraints, in turn, support the policy decision
of focusing, as a general rule, the Office's investigative and prosecutorial efforts
and resources on those who bear the greatest responsibility for those crimes.").
41. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the
Office of the Prosecutor, at 3, September 2003, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_PolicyPaper.pdf.
42. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Update on Communications Received by the
Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, at 1, 10 (Feb. 10, 2006).
43. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Annex to the "Paper on Some Policy Issues
Before the Office of the Prosecutor": Referrals and Communications 1 (Sept.
2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/policy-annexfinal
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In terms of choosing which situations to investigate, the OTP
developed a three-tiered process for analyzing information regarding
potential crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.4 The first phase
"is an initial review to identify those communications that manifestly
do not provide any basis for further action."45 For example, the
Prosecutor responded to information regarding alleged crimes
against humanity committed in Venezuela by saying that, based upon
communications received and a review of external sources, there was
insufficient evidence establishing a "widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population," as required under the Rome Statute's
definition of crimes against humanity.46 Thus, it does not seem that
the OTP ever even considered the gravity of the alleged crimes in
Venezuela, as it determined during the first stage of inquiry that the
Court lacked jurisdiction.47
The second phase of the Prosecutor's analysis is an examination of
the "seriousness" of those crimes that presumably do fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court in order to determine if the situations are of
sufficient gravity to warrant the attention of the ICC.48 The
Prosecutor's decision to forego an investigation into war crimes
allegedly committed by British forces in Iraq illustrates the
distinction between the first two steps of the Prosecutor's analysis.
According to the OTP, an initial evaluation of the information
submitted regarding crimes in Iraq established that there was a
"reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court had been committed, namely wilful killing and inhuman
_210404.pdf [hereinafter Office of the Prosecutor Annex] (explaining that "neither
referrals nor private communications automatically 'trigger' the powers of the
Prosecutor").
44. See id.
45. Id. at 7.
46. Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, Concerning the
Situation in Venezuela, at 3-4, 9 (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP letter to senders reVenezuela 9-February_2006.
pdf [hereinafter Moreno-Ocampo, Letter Concerning Situation in Venezuela].
47. Id. (explaining that the situation in Venezuela cannot be classified as an
armed conflict and therefore does not come within the jurisdiction of the Court).
48. Office of the Prosecutor Annex, supra note 43, at 3-4 (identifying the
second phase as a "more detailed legal and factual analysis of significant
communications").
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treatment."4 9 Hence, the situation in Iraq satisfied the Prosecutor's
first level of analysis. Nevertheless, the Prosecutor concluded that
the situation in Iraq "did not appear to meet the required threshold of
the Statute" at the second level of analysis.50 He explained:
The number of potential victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court in this situation-4 to 12 victims of wilful killing and a limited
number of victims of inhuman treatment-was of a different order than
the number of victims found in other situations under investigation or
analysis by the Office. It is worth bearing in mind that the OTP is
currently investigating three situations involving long-running conflicts in
Northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur. Each of
the three situations under investigation involves thousands of wilful
killings as well as intentional and large-scale sexual violence and
abductions. Collectively, they have resulted in the displacement of more
than 5 million people. Other situations under analysis also feature
hundreds or thousands of such crimes.
51
The Prosecutor also noted that, for war crimes, "a specific gravity
threshold is set down in Article 8(1) [of the Rome Statute], which
states that 'the Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes
in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of
a large-scale commission of such crimes."' 52 While this "threshold is
not an element of the crime," the Prosecutor explained, it does
49. Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, Concerning the
Situation in Iraq, at 8 (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTPletter to senders reVenezuela9February_2006.
pdf [hereinafter Moreno-Ocampo, Letter Concerning Situation in Iraq].
50. Id. at 8.
51. Id. at 9. In contrast to his letter explaining the lack of sufficient gravity in
Iraq, the Prosecutor has stressed the evident gravity present in each of the three
situations currently under investigation by the OTP. See, e.g., ICC, Office of the
Prosecutor, Background: Situation in the Central African Republic (May 22,
2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/press/pressreleases/ICC-OTP-
BN-20070522-220 A EN.pdf (stating that, "according to all the information
available to the OTP, the alleged crimes, notably killings and large-scale sexual
crimes were of sufficient gravity to warrant an investigation"); ICC, FIRST THREE
YEARS, supra note 38, at 6-7 ("After thorough analysis, the Office concluded that
the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Northern
Uganda were the gravest admissible situations under the jurisdiction of the Court.
The situation in Darfur, the Sudan, referred to the Prosecutor by the Security
Council, also clearly met the gravity standard.").
52. Moreno-Ocampo, Letter Concerning Situation in Iraq, supra note 49, at 8.
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"provide guidance that the Court is intended to focus on situations
meeting these requirements."53
Third, looking at those situations likely to be admissible before the
Court-in other words, those situations that fall within the Court's
jurisdiction and meet the gravity threshold 54-the OTP will conduct
"advanced analysis and planning" pursuant to Article 53 of the
Statute,55 which provides in part that the Prosecutor may decline to
initiate an investigation where, "[t]aking into account the gravity of
the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve
the interests of justice. 56
b. Cases
With respect to individual cases, the Prosecutor has said: "case
selection is carried out through careful analysis based on the
53. Id.
54. Of course, the Prosecutor must also consider whether a situation or case
would be inadmissible under any of the provisions of Article 17(1), including:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry
out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to
prosecute; [and]
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article
20 ....
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(l)(a)-(c).
55. Office of the Prosecutor Annex, supra note 43, at 3-4 (mandating that the
OTP conduct an investigation as expeditiously as possible).
56. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(l)(c). Although the term "interests of
justice" was left undefined by the drafters of the Rome Statute, it has generally
been interpreted to mean weighing "between the imperative of justice and the
imperative of peace." Luc C6t&, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion in International Criminal Law, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 162, 178 (2005).
Matthew Brubacher suggests that it "requires the Prosecutor to take account of the
broader interests of the international community, including the potential political
ramifications of an investigation on the political environment of the state over
which he is exercising jurisdiction." Matthew R. Brubacher, Prosecutorial
Discretion Within the International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 71, 81
(2004).
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principles of objectivity and impartiality, and in accordance with the
criteria set out in Article 53 of the Rome Statute," among "the most
important of [which] is gravity."57 More specifically, the Prosecutor
first tries to obtain "as comprehensive a picture as possible of the
crimes allegedly committed. '58 From this overall picture, he
identifies "particularly grave events"5 9 and then traces liability back
to those "most responsible."6
According to the Prosecutor, gravity was the dominant
consideration guiding the selection of his first case in Northern
Uganda, where the OTP has investigated crimes allegedly committed
by both the Lords Resistance Army ("LRA") and the national army,
or Uganda Peoples Defence Forces ("UPDF").61 In October 2005, the
OTP announced that it was charging five members of the LRA under
the Rome Statute, but would not yet bring charges against any
member of the government-led forces. 62 The Prosecutor explained his
decision as follows:
The criteria [sic] for selection of the first case was gravity. We analyzed
the gravity of all crimes in Northern Uganda committed by the LRA and
Ugandan forces. Crimes committed by the LRA were much more
57. MORENO-OCAMPO, INFORMAL MEETING OF LEGAL ADVISORS, supra note
38, at 6.
58. ICC, Second Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593, at 2 (Dec. 13, 2005),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/LMOUNSCReportBEn.
pdf [hereinafter Second Report of the Prosecutor].
59. Id.
60. MORENO-OCAMPO, INFORMAL MEETING OF LEGAL ADVISORS, supra note
38, at 7.
61. Press Release, ICC, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id = 16& 1=en.html (documenting the
Ugandan president's referral of the situation concerning the LRA to the ICC's
prosecutor); see also Luis MORENO-OCAMPO, STATEMENT BY THE CHIEF
PROSECUTOR ON THE UGANDA ARREST WARRANTS (Oct. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_20051014_English.pdf
[hereinafter MORENO-OCAMPO, UGANDA ARREST WARRANTS STATEMENT]
(making clear that the Prosecutor's investigation would cover all crimes committed
in the region, including the alleged crimes of the UPDF).
62. See MORENO-OCAMPO, UGANDA ARREST WARRANTS STATEMENT, supra
note 61, at 4-6 (identifying and outlining the crimes committed by the five charged
members of the LRA).
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numerous and of much higher gravity than alleged crimes committed by
the UPDF. We therefore started with an investigation of the LRA.63
Gravity has also played an important role in guiding the OTP's
investigation of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo
("DRC"). The Prosecutor first began looking at crimes allegedly
committed in DRC in July 2003 and ultimately received a referral
from the DRC government in March 2004.61 The Prosecutor began
his investigation by making a gravity assessment of the entire
country and identifying Ituri as the region where the gravest crimes
had been committed; he then identified the most serious incidents
and focused his investigation on the persons most responsible for
those crimes.65 In a speech delivered to the Legal Advisors to
Ministries of Foreign Affairs in 2005, the Prosecutor explained:
Given the scale of the situation, we expect to be investigating in the DRC
for a long duration. Therefore, we are working sequentially, starting with
one or two cases, selected on the basis of gravity, while continuing to
develop other cases. We have focused our investigation through
63. Id. at 2-3; see also Luis MORENO-OCAMPO, STATEMENT AT THE FOURTH
SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES 2 (Nov. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_20051128_.English.pdf
[hereinafter MORENO-OCAMPO, FOURTH SESSION STATEMENT] (reaffirming that in
the Uganda case, the ICC investigated all groups that had committed crimes there,
not just the LRA). The Prosecutor also noted that his office "selected our first case
based on gravity" and documented that over a two-year period, "the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) was allegedly responsible for at least 2200 killings and
3200 abductions in over 850 attacks." Id. Moreno-Ocampo further asserted that,
given these statistics, it "was clear that we must start with the LRA." Id.; see also
Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 34, at 501 ("Some people say that the only way to
retain our impartiality is to prosecute both the LRA and the UPDF. However, I
think that impartiality means that we apply the same criteria equally to all sides. A
major criterion is gravity. There is no comparison of gravity between the crimes
committed by the Ugandan army and by the LRA-the crimes committed by the
LRA are much more grave than those committed by the Ugandan army. I continue
to collect information on allegations against the UDPF. Then I will determine
whether the gravity and complementarity requirements of the Statute are met for an
investigation.").
64. See generally The Secretary-General, Twentieth Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/832 (Dec. 28,
2005) (describing the situation in the DRC leading to the referral of the case to the
ICC).
65. MORENO-OCAMPO, INFORMAL MEETING OF LEGAL ADVISORS, supra note
38, at 7.
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analysis ... first, we confirmed that the North Eastern region of DRC
(including Ituri) was the area with the gravest crimes within our temporal
jurisdiction; second, we identified the most serious incidents; and third,
we traced responsibilities back to the persons most responsible. Further
cases will be developed in the future, on the basis of Statute criteria.6
6
Finally, in the Darfur situation, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1593 which referred the situation in that region to the
ICC.67 After deciding that there was a reasonable basis to initiate an
investigation, the Prosecutor outlined how the investigation would
proceed in the following terms:
In the first phase of the investigation the Office collects information
relating to the universe of crimes alleged to have taken place in Darfur, as
well as the groups and individuals responsible for those crimes .... In the
second phase of the investigation the Prosecutor will select specific cases
for prosecution . . . . Accordingly, the Office has collated as
comprehensive a picture as possible of the crimes allegedly committed in
Darfur since 1 July 2002 .... From this over-all picture the Office has
identified particularly grave events. 6
8
B. PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I
The first and only judicial interpretation of the gravity threshold
under the Rome Statute came from Pre-Trial Chamber I ("PTC I"),
which discussed the requirements of Article 17(1)(d) in the context
of evaluating the Prosecutor's application for an arrest warrant
against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. PTC I charged Mr. Lubanga, the
first suspect identified in the DRC situation,69 with enlisting and
conscripting children below the age of fifteen to participate actively
in hostilities.7" PTC I brought the charges against Mr. Lubanga in his
capacity as the leader of the Union des patriotes congolais ("UPC"),
66. Id. at 6-7.
67. See ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Fact Sheet: The Situation in Darfur, the
Sudan, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTPFact-
Sheet-Darfur-20070227_en.pdf (describing the U.N. Security Council referral to
the Prosecutor of the situation in Darfur and the ICC's processes since that
referral).
68. Second Report of the Prosecutor, supra note 58, at 2-3.
69. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, supra note 10.
70. A Word from the Prosecutor (ICC), Nov. 2006, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/newsletter/10/en_09.html.
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a rebel movement operating in the Ituri region of the DRC, and its
armed wing, the Forces patriotiques pour la liberation du Congo
("FPLC").71
As an initial matter, the Pre-Trial Chamber noted the distinction
between the "gravity threshold" under Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome
Statute and the "gravity-driven" crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court:
The Chamber ... observes that this gravity threshold is in addition to the
drafters' careful selection of the crimes included in articles 6 to 8 of the
Statute, a selection based on gravity and directed at confining the material
jurisdiction of the Court to the "most serious crimes of international
concern." Hence, the fact that a case addresses one of the most serious
crimes for the international community as a whole is not sufficient for it
to be admissible before the Court.72
The Chamber also confirmed:
The gravity threshold provided for under Article 17(l)(d) of the Statute
must be applied at two different stages: (i) at the stage of initiation of the
investigation of a situation, the relevant situation must meet such a gravity
threshold and (ii) once a case arises from the investigation of a situation,
it must also meet the gravity threshold provided within that provision. 73
PTC I next addressed the requirements of the gravity threshold at
the case stage, as this was the relevant inquiry for purposes of
analyzing the Prosecutor's request for an arrest warrant. As an initial
matter, the Chamber performed a "contextual interpretation,"
determining that "the fact that the gravity threshold of [A]rticle
17(1)(d) of the Statute is in addition to the gravity-driven selection of
crimes included within the material jurisdiction of the Court
indicates that the relevant conduct must present particular features
which render it especially grave. 74 It continued:
71. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, supra note 10, 70-73 (finding that Mr.
Lubanga's position in the UPC and the FPLC made him the most responsible for
its policy of conscripting and using children under the age of fifteen in armed
conflicts).
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The Chamber holds that the following two features must be considered.
First, the conduct which is the subject of a case must be either systematic
(pattern of incidents) or large-scale. If isolated instances of criminal
activity were sufficient, there would be no need to establish an additional
gravity threshold beyond the gravity-driven selection of the crimes ...
included within the material jurisdiction of the Court. Second, in
assessing the gravity of the relevant conduct, due consideration must be
given to the social alarm such conduct may have caused in the
international community.
75
Thus, in the view of PTC I, conduct "must be" either systematic or
large-scale to satisfy the gravity threshold of Article 17(1)(d).76 In
addition, the "social alarm" caused by the conduct must be given
"due consideration. ' 77 The Chamber did not elaborate as to how
these factors themselves are to be understood, nor did it mention any
additional factors as relevant to the gravity determination.
PTC I then performed a "teleological interpretation" of the gravity
requirement.78 Specifically, the Chamber viewed Article 17(1)(d)
against the "backdrop" of Paragraph 5 of the Rome Statute's
Preamble, which "emphasizes that the activities of the Court must
seek to 'put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes
and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes. ' ' 79
According to the Chamber, this teleological interpretation led to the
conclusion that the "gravity threshold is a key tool provided by the
drafters to maximize the Court's deterrent effect. ' 80 As a result, PTC
I continued, "the Chamber must conclude that any retributory effect
of the activities of the Court must be subordinate to the higher
purpose of prevention," 8' which in turn led it "to the conclusion that
other factors, in addition to the gravity of the relevant conduct, must
be considered when determining whether a given case meets [the




78. See generally id. 47-54.





GRA VITY THRESHOLD OF THE ICC
[T]he additional gravity threshold provided for in [A]rticle 17(I)(d) of the
Statute is intended to ensure that the Court initiates cases only against the
most senior leaders suspected of being the most responsible for the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed in any given
situation under investigation.
83
It justified the criteria by asserting that individuals who are "at the
top" of the entities "allegedly responsible for the systematic or large
scale commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court...
are the ones who can most effectively prevent or stop the
commission of those crimes." It also added:
[O]nly by concentrating on this type of individual can the deterrent effects
of the activities of the Court be maximized because other senior leaders in
similar circumstances will know that solely by doing what they can to
prevent the systematic or large-scale commission of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court can they be sure that they will not be prosecuted
by the Court.
8 4
Pre-Trial Chamber I summed up its understanding of the gravity
threshold by stating that a case will meet the requirements of the
Article 17(1)(d) if the following three questions can be answered
affirmatively:
(i) Is the conduct which is the object of a case systematic or large scale
(due consideration should also be given to the social alarm caused to the
international community by the relevant type of conduct)?;
(ii) Considering the position of the relevant person in the State entity,
organi[z]ation or armed group to which he belongs, can it be considered
that such person falls within the category of most senior leaders of the
situation under investigation?; and
83. Id. 50 (emphasis added). This additional factor is itself determined by
reference to three sub-factors: (i) the rank of the persons-for instance, whether
they are the most senior leaders; (ii) the role played by that person, whether by
acting or failing to act, in the commission of systematic or large scale crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court; and (iii) the role played by the state entities,
organizations or armed groups to which the person belonged in the overall
commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Id. 51-52.
84. Id. TT 53-54.
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(iii) Does the relevant person fall within the category of most senior
leaders suspected of being most responsible, considering (1) the role
played by the relevant person through acts or omissions when the State
entities, organizations or armed groups to which he belongs commit
systematic or large-scale crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and
(2) the role played by such State entities, organi[z]ations or armed groups
in the overall commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court in
the relevant situation?
85
Notably, the Chamber recognized the fact that the Office of the
Prosecutor had already indicated that it considers similar factors in
analyzing the gravity of a given situation or case.86 However, PTC I
also stated that the factors outlined in its decision were not
discretionary considerations, but rather necessary conditions for
meeting the gravity threshold under the Rome Statute.87
Applying its newly-defined test to the case against Mr. Lubanga,
Pre-Trial Chamber I first found that the conduct alleged by the
Prosecutor against the suspect-including the enlistment,
conscription, and use of "hundreds of children under the age of
fifteen" in hostilitiesg--caused "social alarm" to the international
community based on the extent of the relevant policy and practice.8 9
The Court then concluded that Lubanga fulfilled the "senior leaders"
requirement, finding reasonable grounds to believe that the accused
had been president of the UPC since its foundation in 2000, and the
commander-in-chief of the UPC's armed forces, the FPLC,
throughout 2002 and 2003. 90 Furthermore, the Pre-Trial Chamber
noted that Lubanga
exercised de facto authority which corresponded to his positions as the
first and only president of the UPC and Commander-in-Chief of the
FPLC, which included inter alia the authority to negotiate, sign and
implement ceasefires or peace agreements and participate in negotiations
85. Id. 63.
86. See id. 7 61 ("[T]he Chamber observes that the Prosecution has already
adopted some of the factors that the Chamber considers part of the core content of
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relating to controlling access of [the U.N. Mission in the DRC] and other
U.N. personnel
to parts of territory of Ituri under UPC/FPLC control.9'
Finally, the Court held that there was reason to believe Lubanga
was among those "most responsible" for the alleged crimes based on
his "ultimate control over the UPC/FPLC's alleged policy/practice of
enlisting . . . and using to participate actively in hostilities children
under the age of fifteen." 92 Indeed, the Court concluded that
Lubanga's role in the relevant crimes "could not have been more
relevant."93 Significantly, Pre-Trial Chamber I acknowledged that the
UPC/FPLC was "only a regional group," and that "during the
relevant time there were in addition to the UPC/FPLC a number of
other regional armed groups involved in the armed conflict in
Ituri." 94 Nevertheless, the Court held that Lubanga may be
considered among the "senior leaders suspected of being most
responsible" for the crimes due to his leadership position and his
"unique role" in the UPC/FPLC's adoption and implementation of
the policy and practice of recruiting children for active participation
in armed hostilities.95 This finding suggests that one may be among
those "most responsible" even if the Court knows other individuals
who bear similar or even greater responsibility for a particular crime
than the suspect.
III. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Generally speaking, the application of the gravity threshold by
both Pre-Trial Chamber I and the Office of the Prosecutor has been
consistent with the intent of the Rome Statute's drafters, as well as
the overall purposes envisioned for the International Criminal Court,
which include combating impunity and maximizing deterrence.
Nevertheless, there are aspects of both the Chamber's and the
Prosecutor's interpretation and application of the gravity threshold
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recommendations aimed at improving the process of selecting
investigations and prosecutions, and of evaluating the admissibility
of situations and cases, which we believe, in turn, will increase
public perceptions of the credibility and legitimacy of the ICC.
A. PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I'S INTERPRETATION OF GRAVITY
THRESHOLD
Pre-Trial Chamber I's February 2006 interpretation of the Rome
Statute's gravity threshold carries potentially significant
consequences for the operations of the ICC because it is the sole
judicial interpretation available under Article 17(1)(d) to date.
Indeed, no other decision of the Court contains any discussion of
gravity as a condition of admissibility, despite PTC I's holding that
"the gravity threshold provided for under [A]rticle 17(l)(d) of the
Statute must be applied" at both the situation phase and the case
phase of proceedings. 96 Furthermore, Pre-Trial Chamber I's February
2006 decision purports to set forth "necessary" conditions for
satisfying the gravity threshold,97 which means that the impact of the
decision could substantially affect the types of situations investigated
and cases prosecuted before the ICC.
As explained above, Pre-Trial Chamber I determined that the
gravity analysis involves requirements relating to both the nature of
the conduct and the rank and role of the perpetrator. 98 While the
decision is helpful in that it provides guidance as to how "gravity"--
a term not defined in the Rome Statute-will be interpreted by the
ICC, a court with limited resources that must focus on those crimes
that most warrant international prosecution, we believe that the Pre-
Trial Chamber has interpreted the prerequisites for satisfying Article
17(1)(d) too strictly. Specifically, we recommend that the standard
set forth by the Chamber not be applied so rigidly as to exclude
exceptional circumstances which might nevertheless satisfy the
purpose of the gravity threshold.
96. Id. 44 (emphasis added).
97. Id. 62.
98. See id. 70 (stating that Lubanga was both senior leadership and the
driving force behind the recruitment of child soldiers).
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1. ICC Should Consider Factors Other Than Systematicity or Scale
and Social Alarm in Analyzing Whether Conduct Satisfies
Articlel 7(1)(d)
In terms of determining what conduct satisfies Article 17(1)(d),
PTC I held that "the conduct which is the subject of a case must be
either systematic (pattern of incidents) or large-scale." 99 In addition,
the Chamber said that, "in assessing the gravity of the relevant
conduct, due consideration must be given to the social alarm such
conduct may have caused in the international community."' 00
However, as noted earlier, the Chamber did not elaborate as to how
these factors themselves are to be understood, nor did it mention any
additional factors as relevant to the gravity determination.' 0
In announcing the requirement that, to satisfy the Article 17(1)(d)
threshold, conduct must be either "systematic" or "large-scale," the
PTC observed: "If isolated instances of criminal activity were
sufficient, there would be no need to establish an additional gravity
threshold beyond the gravity-driven selection of the crimes" falling
within the jurisdiction of the Court. 02 This statement may appear
obvious enough at first, but in fact, it suggests that the term "gravity"
is synonymous with the terms "systematic" or "large-scale," thereby
ignoring the fact that the drafters of the gravity threshold chose to
use the former language and not the latter. Thus, while it is likely
that the majority of crimes considered for prosecution before the ICC
will involve conduct committed on a systematic or large-scale basis,
PTC I's decision requiring such systematicity or scale as a condition
of Article 17(l)(d) in every case does not appear warranted,
particularly where, for instance, "the number of victims would be
relatively small in comparison to other situations, but where the
impact was devastating to the countries concerned." 03 To illustrate,
if one considers the 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center
99. Id. 46.
100. Id.
101. Cf id. (demonstrating that the PTC stated these factors but did not discuss
their definitions).
102. Id.
103. CHRISTOPHER KEITH HALL, SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT PROSECUTORIAL POLICY AND STRATEGY AND EXTERNAL
RELATIONS 21, 28 (2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp
/hall.pdf.
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in New York, the sheer number of victims may pale in comparison to
other incidents of violence, but the impact of the attack on the United
States was incomparable to anything the country has witnessed in
recent history. A similar point is made by the following question
posed by the ICC Prosecutor in 2006:
In the Congo a few months ago, guerrilla groups attacked and killed ten
Blue Helmets [referring to United Nations forces]; their goal was to force
the U.N. to withdraw. It would be catastrophic without the U.N. in the
east of the Congo. Is gravity just the number of killings, or is it other
factors, with wider-scale implications? 104
Yet another factor that seems particularly relevant to assessing
"gravity" is the vulnerability of the targeted group. This is because
looking at the sheer number of victims or the systematic nature in
which crimes were committed does not take into account the
particular suffering that may be inflicted on a population through
attacks made on, for example, women, children, or disabled persons.
An attack on religious or other revered community leaders may cause
similarly heightened suffering.
It may be the case that PTC I's reference to "social alarm" could
account for some of these additional factors, but the Chamber did not
explain the term, making it difficult to understand what, outside of
the conscription and use of child soldiers in armed conflict, would
constitute "social alarm.""1 5 Furthermore, it is unclear why the
Chamber has chosen to look to the social alarm caused by the alleged
conduct in the "international community"; the impact on the
community or nation where the crimes occurred seems a more
meaningful standard, particularly in light of the Rome Statute's
broader goals of ending impunity and promoting deterrence.
The notion that "gravity" cannot always be determined by
reference to scale or systematicity is supported by the practice of the
ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and
Rwanda ("ICTR"). While the statutes of these tribunals do not limit
the admissibility of cases according to gravity, both the ICTY and
the ICTR do apply the concept of "gravity" in the context of
104. Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 34, at 498.
105. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, supra note 10, 46.
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sentencing. 0 6 Furthermore, the overall purpose of analyzing the
gravity of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICTY and ICTR at the
sentencing phase is similar to the larger purposes of the Rome
Statute's overall gravity threshold-namely, ending impunity and
maximizing deterrence. 107  Thus, although conducted under a
different context by tribunals of a different nature, it is nevertheless
instructive to examine the ad hoc tribunals' approach to the concept
of gravity. Importantly, the relevant jurisprudence of those tribunals
shows that, although "scale" is a key factor to be used in evaluating
the gravity of a perpetrator's crimes,1°8 a number of additional
"aggravating factors" are examined, including the impact on the
106. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704,
S/25704/Add. I, adopted by the Security Council U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,
1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 23(2), U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (noting that when imposing sentences, "the Trial
Chambers should take into account such factors as the gravity of the offence and
the individual circumstances of the convicted person").
107. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-
96-10, ICTR-96-17, Judgment and Sentence, 884 (Feb. 21, 2003), available at
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/NtakirutimanaE/udgement/ch5.htm
(explaining that, "the principle of gradation in sentencing ... enables the Tribunals
to distinguish between crimes which are of the most heinous nature, and those
which, although reprehensible and deserving severe penalty, should not receive the
highest penalties. The imposition of the highest penalties upon those at the upper
end of the sentencing scale, such as those who planned or ordered atrocities, or
those who committed crimes with especial zeal or sadism, enables the Chamber to
punish, deter, and consequently stigmatize those crimes at a level that corresponds
to their overall magnitude and reflects the extent of the suffering inflicted upon the
victims"); Prosecutor v. Karera, Case No. ICTR-01-74-T, Judgment and Sentence,
572 (Dec. 7, 2007) ("[The Chamber] shall consider the principle of gradation in
sentencing which enables it to punish, deter and consequently stigmatize the
crimes considered, at a level that corresponds to their overall magnitude and
reflects the extent of suffering inflicted upon the victims."); Prosecutor v. Krstic,
Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment, 693 (Aug. 2, 2001) ("The practice of the Tribunal
... reflects two objectives of a sentence: the need to punish an individual for the
crimes committed and the need to deter other individuals from committing similar
crimes."); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- 1, Sentencing Judgment, 7 (Nov.
11, 1999) (stressing that "deterrence is probably the most important factor in the
assessment of appropriate sentences for violations of international humanitarian
law") (internal citations omitted).
108. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20; Judgment and
Sentence, 571 (May 15, 2003) (stating that the numbers of victims killed by the
accused was an aggravating factor with respect to the crime of genocide because it
speaks to the gravity of the offense).
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victims;"°9 the manner in which the crime was carried out;110 the role
of the perpetrator in commission of the crimes;"' and the
vulnerability of the targeted group (for example, the vulnerability of
women, children, or the handicapped).1 2 Overall, however, the most
dramatic feature revealed from a review of ad hocs' sentencing
jurisprudence is the amorphous nature of the factors denoting
gravity. This approach recognizes that each situation presents its own
unique features indicative of the gravity of the crimes, typically
demonstrated by a combination of factors. As noted above, the OTP
has pointed to a variety of factors as relevant to determining the
gravity of crimes, which largely overlap with the types of things
109. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33, 703 (noting that "the circumstance that the
victim detainees were completely at the mercy of their captors, [and] the physical
and psychological suffering inflicted upon witnesses to the crime ... [are] relevant
in assessing the gravity of the crimes in this case," as appropriate "consideration of
those circumstances gives 'a voice' to the suffering of the victims"); Prosecutor v.
Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, Judgment, 512 (Mar. 15, 2002) (holding that "the
extent of the long-term physical, psychological and emotional suffering of the
immediate victims is relevant to the gravity of the offences").
110. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Sentence, 18 (May 21,
1999) (holding that the "heinous means" by which the accused committed the
crimes was an aggravating factor); Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33, 703 (considering
"the 'indiscriminate, disproportionate, terrifying' or 'heinous' means and methods
used to commit the crimes" as part of the Chamber's gravity analysis).
111. Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39, Sentencing Judgment,
29-30 (Feb. 5, 1999) (stating that the fact that the Accused gave orders as a de
facto leader and he ordered several people executed were found to be aggravating
circumstances, as was his "voluntary participation" in the commission of the
crimes); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Sentence, 3 (Oct. 2,
1998) (stating that the Chamber considered the following to be aggravating factors:
Akayesu "consciously chose to participate" in systematic killings; his status in
government made him the most senior government personality in Taba and in this
capacity he was responsible for protecting the population, which he failed to do; he
"publicly incited people to kill"; he also ordered the killing of a number of persons;
he participated in the killings; and he supported "the rape of many women in the
bureau communal" through his presence and acts).
112. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33, 702 (agreeing "with the Prosecutor that the
number of victims and their suffering are relevant factors in determining the
sentence and that the mistreatment of women or children is especially significant in
the present case"); Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1, Judgment, 702
(Nov. 2, 2001) (holding that "the sexual violence inflicted upon the women, and
the discriminatory nature of the crimes . . . are relevant factors in assessing the
gravity of the crimes").
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considered by the ICTY and the ICTR in their own approaches to
gravity.1"
In sum, while it is likely that the majority of crimes considered for
prosecution before the ICC will involve conduct committed on a
systematic or large-scale basis, PTC I's decision requiring such
systematicity or scale as a condition of Article 17(1)(d) in every case
does not appear warranted. Rather, the gravity analysis should be
sufficiently flexible so as to allow the Court to consider exceptional
circumstances, beyond scale and systematicity, as contributing to the
gravity of a given case. In particular, factors such as the impact on
victims, the manner in which the crimes were carried out, and the
vulnerability of the victim population may weigh in favor of finding
that a particular case meets the gravity threshold, even if it does not
involve crimes on the same scale or the same degree of systematicity
as might typically be seen in cases coming before the ICC.
2. Focusing on Senior Leaders Suspected of Being Most
Responsible Is Prudent As a Matter of Policy, but Is Not Required by
the Rome Statute
As explained above, the Prosecutor, as a matter of policy, has
stated that the OTP will focus its investigative efforts on those
bearing the greatest responsibility for alleged crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court."4 The "obvious intuitive appeal""' 5 of this
approach has been well-summarized by one commentator:
[P]owerful considerations dictate that if one is to pursue a path of
prosecution, and if one must make selections, it makes sense to give
priority to high-level offenders, at least where those offenders exhibit a
high degree of culpability. The planners and leaders of atrocities are
113. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting that the OTP has stated
that the gravity analysis involves such factors as the number of persons killed; the
number of victims, particularly in the case of crimes against "physical integrity,"
such as willful killing or rape; the severity of the crimes; the scale of the crimes;
the systematicity of the crimes; the nature of the crimes; the manner in which
crimes were committed; and the impact of the crimes).
114. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
115. Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial
Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
583, 628-29 (2007) (debating whether more serious offenders should always be the
focus and noting that guilty, high-level commanders may be less morally culpable
than their subordinates who participated directly in the primary offense).
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broadly considered the most culpable, their arrest and prosecution is
likely to have the greatest symbolic value and provide the greatest sense
of justice for the largest number of victims, their incarceration is most
likely to aid political transition, they provide a relatively narrow target for
deterrence, and the deterrence resulting from their punishment, if
effective, will have a broader impact than that of individual low-level
perpetrators. 116
At the same time, the Prosecutor has recognized that in some
cases, the focus of an investigation may go wider than high-ranking
officers.'17 This approach was praised by Human Rights Watch,
which has "welcome[d] the prosecutor's policy of focusing on those
who bear the greatest responsibility," while also "urg[ing] the office
to keep a degree of flexibility with respect to [its] implementation""' 8
Yet in February 2006, Pre-Trial Chamber I seemed to remove the
flexibility announced in the Prosecutor's stated policy.1 9
Specifically, PTC I held in the context of the Lubanga case that,
viewed against the backdrop of the Rome Statute's Preamble, Article
17(1)(d) must be seen as a "key tool provided by the drafters to
maximize the Court's deterrent effect,"'' 20 and that therefore "any
retributory effect of the activities of the Court must be subordinate to
the higher purpose of prevention."' 2' As mentioned earlier, the
Chamber then concluded that, in order to maximize the Court's
deterrent effect, cases should be initiated only against the "most
senior leaders suspected of being the most responsible for the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court.' ' 22
116. Id.
117. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the
Office of the Prosecutor, at 3, Sept. 2003, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_PolicyPaper.pdf.
118. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Transcript, Second Public Hearing: NGOs
and Other Experts, at 6, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs
/otp/OTPPH2_HGNGO.pdf; see also infra note 129 and accompanying text
(explaining why, under certain circumstances, the ICC may want to prosecute
individuals who are not senior leaders suspected of being the most responsible for
the commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court).
119. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
120. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, supra note 10, 48.
121. Id. 47-48.
122. Id. 50; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing the
three sub-factors to be considered when determining whether an individual is the
most senior leader responsible for the criminal activity).
[23:807
GRA VITY THRESHOLD OF THE ICC
While focusing on the so-called "big fish" may be wise as a matter
of policy, PTC I's interpretation of the threshold as requiring that
cases be brought only against the "most senior leaders suspected of
being the most responsible for the crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court" '123 is not necessarily supported by the Statute and its
drafting history. Indeed, the Pre-Trial Chamber seems to have
narrowed the personal jurisdiction of the ICC in a manner that was
never contemplated by the drafters. Article 17(1) refers back to
Article 1 of the Rome Statute,'24 which in turn states that the ICC
"shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this
Statute."' 25 Thus, by contrast to other, non-permanent international
criminal bodies, such as the Special Court of Sierra Leone ("SCSL")
and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia
("ECCC"), the ICC's personal jurisdiction is not expressly limited to
any particular class or category of persons. 12 6 Moreover, the standard
imposed by PTC I is very strict, requiring that the perpetrator be both
a "senior leader" and among those "most responsible" for the alleged
crime(s). 27 Applying this standard literally would presumably
123. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, supra note 10, 50.
124. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1) ("Having regard to paragraph 10 of
the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible
where. ... )  Paragraph 10 of the Preamble provides: "Emphasizing that the
International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions ..... Id. pmbl.
125. Id. art. 1 (emphasis added); see also id. pmbl. (referring simply to the
"perpetrators" of "the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole").
126. See Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Republic of
Kampuchea, art. 1, NS/RKM!1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004) (Revised translation by the
Council of Jurists and the Secretariat of the Khmer Rouge Trial Task Force, Nov.
23, 2004) [hereinafter ECCC Establishment Law] ("The purpose of this law is to
bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most
responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law,
international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions
recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April
1975 to 6 January 1979 ...."); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art.
1(1), Jan. 16, 2002 ("The Special Court shall .... have the power to prosecute
persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra
Leone since 30 November 1996.").
127. See supra notes 82 and 83 and accompanying text.
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prevent the ICC from prosecuting someone like "Comrade Duch," a
former member of the Khmer Rouge who has been indicted by the
ECCC for crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly
committed at the Tuol Sleng prison, where thousands of people were
imprisoned, tortured, and killed between 1975 and 1979.128 Although
Duch was not among the top leadership of the Khmer Rouge, the fact
that the murder and torture of civilians was committed on such a
widespread basis under his authority at the prison renders him
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the ECCC, which includes
individuals who were either among the "senior leaders" or those
"most responsible" for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court. 129
Furthermore, as a practical matter, one can imagine situations
where the objectives of the Rome Statute-including ending
impunity, promoting deterrence, and giving voice to the victims of
the world's most heinous crimes' 3°-would be served through the
prosecution of an individual who might not be described as among.
the "most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible." For
example, Human Rights Watch has pointed out that, "[i]n some
contexts, pursuing those officials further down in the chain of
command .. .could have a significant impact for victims on the
ground and/or may be necessary for the implementation of an
effective prosecutorial strategy in a particular country situation."13
128. See, e.g., Decision on Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order of
Kaing Guek Eav, Alias "DUCH," Criminal Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-
OCIJ, 29 (Dec. 3, 2007), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet
/courtDoc/16/PTCdecision-appeal-duchC5-45_EN.pdf.
129. ECCC Establishment Law, supra note 126, art. 1.
130. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl. ("Mindful that during this century
millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities
that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; ... Affirming that the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking
measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation,
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus
to contribute to the prevention of such crimes ....").
131. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Transcript, Second Public Hearing: NGOs
and Other Experts, at 7, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library
/organs/otp/OTPPH2_HGNGO.pdf. Using Darfur as an example, Ms. Mattioli
explained:
For example, in the context of Darfur, HRW believes it is important for the
ICC to prosecute state governors and provincial commissioners, as well as
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Others have similarly argued that a "prosecutorial design that
includes followers as well as leaders may often serve victim interests
better than would a leaders-only design. ' 132 At least one
commentator has also challenged the idea that a policy of deterrence
is best served by focusing strictly on senior leaders, calling instead
for the prosecution of a "cross-section of perpetrators."'33 This
commentator explains:
Prosecuting a cross-section of perpetrators may be desirable in terms not
only of retribution but also of deterrence. In support of the strategy of
Janjaweed leaders. Our research suggests that their prosecution could have a
tremendous impact for the victims on the ground by, for example, allowing
victims who have been displaced as a result of the 'ethnic cleansing'
campaign to return to their villages. In addition, going after mid-level ranks
may have practical advantages in helping the prosecutor to build cases leading
to those at the top level in the chain of command. As such, it may be
beneficial to also bring forward cases involving mid-level perpetrators, at
least initially, for prosecution in certain country situations.
Id.; see also Murphy, supra note 11, at 293 (arguing that the policy of focusing on
senior leaders only may lead to an impunity gap because it "may exclude others
equally culpable of heinous crimes, but who did not hold positions of authority").
132. Madeline Morris, Complementarity and Its Discontents: States, Victims,
and the International Criminal Court, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 177, 187
(Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). Morris explains that in addition to being "concerned
with leaders, victims pervasively express a deep and heartfelt desire that their
particular perpetrators be brought to justice." Id. Thus, while she recognizes that,
"[o]bviously, not all leaders and not all followers can be prosecuted in most
contexts of crimes of mass violence," Morris believes that a prosecutorial strategy
that includes both leaders and followers would mean that "at least some victims'
needs would be met and, more to the point, such prosecutions would constitute an
acknowledgment of the interests of victims and of their legitimacy." Id. In
addition, Morris writes, "even for victims whose own individual perpetrators are
not prosecuted, there may be symbolic retributive value in the prosecution,
condemnation and punishment of a full cross-section of perpetrators, including
followers as well as leaders." Id. Jose Alvarez has made a similar point in the
context of the Rwandan genocide. See Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of
Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 400 (1999) ("While
international trials of a few Rwandan high-level perpetrators will provide some
additional details about much that we already know, namely how the genocide was
orchestrated and how the actual killings were organized, such trials will tell us next
to nothing about those most directly involved in the killings or about their
individual victims. They will not tell family members where victims are buried or
the particular circumstances of their deaths. And they will not tell anyone how the
average Rwandan, not in a position of authority, was co-opted into mass
slaughter.").
133. Morris, supra note 132, at 188.
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prosecuting only the top leaders, the argument often is made that it is
most important to prosecute the leaders because "without the leaders,
these crimes would not occur." It is equally true, however, that without
the followers these crimes would not occur. Indeed, there are probably
more than a handful of would-be leaders of crimes of mass violence
whose dangerous aspirations are never realized for lack of followers.
Applying deterrents at top, middle and lower levels of criminal
hierarchies may be a more effective deterrence strategy, ultimately, than
exclusive prosecution of those in leadership positions. 
134
One way to resolve this issue would be to interpret PTC I's
February 2006 reference to "senior leaders" as including persons
who, while not necessarily at the top of any military or political
structure, exercised such authority with respect to the crimes at issue
that they may nevertheless be treated as de facto leaders. As one
commentator has explained:
In the [Pre-Trial] Chamber's opinion, only by concentrating on this type
of individual [i.e., senior leaders suspected of being the most responsible]
can the deterrent effects of the activities of the Court be maximized
because other senior leaders in similar circumstances will know that
solely by doing what they can to prevent the systematic or large-scale
commissions of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court can they be
sure that they will not be prosecuted .... In this regard, the concept of
"senior leader" does not preclude those holding no formal rank but who
exercised significant defacto command or leadership positions.135
This approach is supported by the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which has
in recent years limited itself to prosecuting only "senior leaders," but
has interpreted "senior leaders" as being satisfied by individuals who
either carried a particular hierarchical rank or who may be
considered senior due to their actual role in the commission of the
crime.'36 However, it is not altogether obvious from the language of
134. Id.
135. See Murphy, supra note 11, at 290.
136. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ademi, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for
Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, 29
(Sept. 14, 2005) ("As far as the level of responsibility of the Accused is concerned,
the Referral Bench recalls that in light of the history and purpose of Rule 11 bis,
the level of responsibility should be interpreted so as to include both the military
rank of the Accused and their actual role in the commission of the crimes."). Note
that this decision was delivered in the context of Rule 11 bis, which allows the
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PTC I's February 2006 decision that this is the approach that will be
taken by the ICC going forward. For example, although PTC I stated
that it will look to three sub-factors to determine if an individual is
among the "most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible
for the crimes"-namely, the rank of the person; the role played by
that person in the commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court; and the role played by the state entities, organizations, or
armed groups to which the person belonged in the overall
commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court' 37-it is
unclear whether each of these factors must exist to support a finding
that the person is a senior leader suspected of being most responsible,
or whether one factor may outweigh another factor in a given case.
Indeed, in summarizing its conditions for satisfying the gravity
threshold, PTC I reiterated that among the questions needed to be
answered affirmatively "before the Court will meet the gravity
threshold" is the following: "Considering the position of the relevant
person in the State entity, organisation or armed group to which he
belongs, can it be considered that such person falls within the
category of most senior leaders of the situation under
investigation.""13 Such language suggests that the Pre-Trial Chamber
may not find the criterion of "senior leader" satisfied based on an
individual's role in the commission of the relevant crimes alone.
In the event that the Chamber did intend to allow some flexibility
in determining who is a "senior leader," such that it will not require
that an accused have achieved some particular rank in a military or
political hierarchy, this intent should be clarified. Moreover, as with
our preceding recommendation regarding the inclusion of factors
beyond "scale" and "systematicity" as part of the Court's analysis of
the gravity of crimes in certain circumstances, flexibility might also
prove useful with respect to determining whether a particular
perpetrator meets the gravity threshold even if he or she is not among
the "most senior" leaders "most responsible" for the relevant crimes.
ICTY to transfer cases not involving "senior leaders" to domestic jurisdictions.
Thus, by stating that the level of responsibility should be interpreted as including
"both" the military rank of the Accused and their actual role, the point is that either
of these factors could lead to a conclusion that the Accused satisfies the "senior
leaders" requirements and may not be transferred from the ICTY. Id.
137. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, supra note 10, 51-52.
138. Id. 63 (emphasis added).
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B. THE GRAVITY THRESHOLD VERSUS EXERCISE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
As discussed above, the Prosecutor seems to apply the concept of
gravity at two distinct stages in determining whether to initiate an
investigation or pursue a particular prosecution. First, as a matter of
statutory obligation, the Prosecutor considers whether the situation or
case under consideration will be admissible before the ICC, which
requires inter alia that the situation or case meet the gravity
threshold set forth in Article 17(1)(d). Second, the Prosecutor has, as
a matter of policy, stated that gravity is "one of the most important
criteria for selection of [the OTP's] situations and cases."' 39 In other
words, even after the Prosecutor has satisfied himself that the
jurisdiction and admissibility requirements of the Rome Statute have
been met, he has apparently chosen, as a matter of prosecutorial
discretion, to highlight the relative gravity of situations and cases as
a means of determining which will be investigated and prosecuted.
Two related observations flow from this dual-use of gravity. The
first is that it has not always been clear when the Prosecutor is
talking about gravity as a requirement under the Rome Statute versus
gravity as one of presumably many factors leading to the OTP's
decision to prosecute certain crimes over other crimes. For instance,
the Prosecutor has repeatedly explained his decision to pursue an
investigation of crimes committed by the Lord's Resistance Army in
Uganda-prior to looking at the alleged crimes of government
forces-based on the determination that the crimes committed by the
LRA "were much more numerous and of much higher gravity than
alleged crimes committed by" the national army.140 Notably, the
Prosecutor did not say in this context-as he did with the overall
139. Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 34, at 498.
140. MORENO-OCAMPO, UGANDA ARREST WARRANTS STATEMENT, supra note
61, at 2-3; see also MORENO-OCAMPO, FOURTH SESSION STATEMENT, supra note
63, at 2 ("In Uganda, we examined information concerning all groups that had
committed crimes in the region. We selected our first case based on gravity.
Between July 2002 and June 2004, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was
allegedly responsible for at least 2200 killings and 3200 abductions in over 850
attacks. It was clear that we must start with the LRA.").
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situation in Iraq, for example 4 '-that the alleged conduct of
government forces was insufficiently grave to be admissible in a case
before the ICC. Rather, he has stressed that the LRA's conduct was
more grave than that of the government forces. In other words, it
appears that the Prosecutor's choice to investigate and prosecute the
conduct of the LRA prior to looking into the alleged crimes of the
government was based on an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, not
as a result of the gravity requirement under Article 17(1)(d). If the
Prosecutor is not careful to distinguish between considerations of
gravity for purposes of determining whether a situation or a case is
admissible under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, and considerations
of gravity for purposes of determining which situations and cases,
among those that are presumably admissible, will be investigated or
prosecuted as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, the public
perception of the Court may suffer. Public perception of the ICC is
inextricably linked with establishing the Court's legitimacy,
particularly in its early years of operations, and transparency as to
how the Office of the Prosecutor determines which crimes are
admissible before the Court, and of those crimes, which crimes will
be investigated and prosecuted, is in turn essential to promoting
public confidence in the ICC's work.'42
The second observation is that the public's trust in the work of the
Court would likely be strengthened if the Prosecutor clearly
communicated to the public that, once the statutory requirements
governing the admissibility of a situation or case are met-including
satisfaction of the gravity threshold-the relative gravity of crimes
may be one factor among many that enters into the Prosecutor's
ultimate decision to initiate an investigation or prosecute a case. The
need for such clarity is illustrated by recent commentary raising
concerns over the OTP's divergent approach to the selection of its
first cases in the context of the Uganda situation and the DRC
141. Moreno-Ocampo, Letter Concerning Situation in Iraq, supra note 49, at 8-9
("According to the available information, it did not appear that any of the criteria
of Article 8(1) were satisfied.").
142. See, e.g., C6t&, supra note 56, at 171 ("The international criminal tribunal,
which has a mandate to examine armed conflicts of a political and/or ethnic nature
where suspicion prevails and which needs to rapidly establish its credibility and
independence, must exercise its powers in the most transparent way.").
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situation, respectively.143 Specifically, referring to a statement by the
OTP in which it explained that Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was charged
as the first suspect in the DRC situation because he was facing
"imminent release" from prison in the DRC' 44-meaning that if the
ICC delayed its case against Lubanga he may have evaded arrest-
one commentator observed: "One might wonder, therefore, whether
the selection of the Lubanga case was based on gravity or by his
'possible imminent release.' This shows contradiction and a clear
deviation from the policy initially adopted by the OTP in relation to
the gravity selection process. ' 145 The commentator concluded that
the OTP's application of the gravity criterion "raises some
concerns," noting that in the case of Lubanga, the OTP "focused on
crimes that are less serious than others committed within the context
of grave events.' 46
It is worth noting, however, that the OTP may legitimately be
persuaded by different factors in different contexts when selecting
situations and cases, as the Rome Statute-like the statutes of the ad
hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as
well as the practice of many national jurisdictions" 7--allows the
143. Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Gravity Threshold Under the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 19 CRIM. L. F. 35, 41 (2008).
144. ICC, FIRST THREE YEARS, supra note 38, at 8 ("In the situation in the DRC,
the Office initially investigated a wide range of crimes allegedly committed,
seeking to represent the broad range of criminality. The Office subsequently
decided in its first case to focus on the crime of enlisting and conscripting children
under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities. The
decision to focus on this crime was triggered by the possible imminent release of
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who had been under arrest in the DRCfor approximately
one year before he was transferred to the Court.") (emphasis added).
145. El Zeidy, supra note 143, at 41.
146. Id. at 56-57.
147. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 11, at 308 ("The International Military
Tribunals did not deal with all the possible suspects. The Chief Prosecutors
indicted a mere 24 before the Nuremberg Tribunal, and 28 in the Tokyo Tribunal.
The prosecutors for the ICTY and ICTR also adopted a selective approach to the
prosecution of suspects."); Greenawalt, supra note 115, at 599 ("Questions of
prosecutorial discretion.., are not unique to the International Criminal Court. The
structure of prosecutorial authority set forth in the Rome Statute closely resembles
that typical of common law systems, in which [the] prosecutor, subject to varying
degrees of judicial supervision, enjoy the primary authority to select and pursue
criminal cases."); Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and
Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97
AM. J. INT'L LAW 510, 518 (2003) ("Since crime in virtually every country exceeds
852 [23:807
GRA VITY THRESHOLD OF THE ICC
Prosecutor ultimate discretion to choose where to initiate
investigations and which cases to prosecute. 48 Indeed, as a practical
matter, prosecutorial discretion is a necessary tool for ensuring a
court's efficacy, particularly in post-conflict situations where the
number of crimes admissible before a court will far outweigh the
resources available to prosecute those crimes. 149 This fact is
highlighted by the experiences of the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which
demonstrated that "even out of the group of the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole, not all crimes
committed can in practice be prosecuted."' 5 ° As former Prosecutor of
the ICTY and ICTR, Justice Louise Arbour, observed as early as
1997: The real challenge faced by the ICC Prosecutor will be "to
choose from many meritorious complaints the appropriate ones for
the ability of the criminal justice system to adjudicate it, prosecutors must be able
to exercise their discretion to pursue or decline particular cases in order to maintain
a functioning criminal justice system.").
148. Murphy, supra note 11, at 293 (the Prosecutor's discretion is evidenced by
the fact that "he or she is under no obligation to initiate proceedings once a
situation has been referred to the OTP"); Brubacher, supra note 56, at 75 ("In the
ICC, prosecutorial discretion is implied by the fact that the Prosecutor is under no
obligation to initiate proceedings once a situation has been referred to the OTP.").
149. C6t, supra note 56, at 164-65 ("The last ten years of practice of the
existing international criminal Tribunals (i.e. the ICTR, ICTY and SCSL) have
demonstrated that the efficiency of the international Prosecutor-his capacity to
investigate and prosecute in order to fulfill his mandate with limited resources and
time-resides in the discretionary exercise of his powers."); AVRIL MCDONALD
& ROELOF HAVEMAN, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION-SOME THOUGHTS ON
"OBJECTIFYING" THE EXERCISE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION BY THE
PROSECUTOR OF THE ICC 2 (2003), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/mcdonald-haveman.pdf ("In the beginning of the Court it
may be tempting to" investigate and subsequently prosecute "as much [sic] cases
as possible, to guarantee that within the first 7 years of its existence at least some
substantive cases are dealt with before the court, and thus proving its importance.
However, if not from the start then within a short time, there will be limits to the
Court's capacity. The Court, for this and other reasons, will have to decide what its
purpose, role, capacity and limitations in a particular situation are; decisions that
will, in the first instance, have to be made by the Office of the Prosecutor
(OTP)."); Amnesty International, supra note 28 ("The criteria for initiating an
investigation and for commencing a prosecution should be clearly spelled out in
the statute and rules, but should leave some flexibility for prosecutorial discretion,
particularly since it is unlikely that the prosecutor will have the resources to
investigate and prosecute every case where the court has jurisdiction and states
have failed to fulfil their responsibility to bring those responsible to justice.").
150. Murphy, supra note 11, at 287.
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international intervention, rather than to weed out weak or frivolous
ones."'' In addition, vesting the Prosecutor with ultimate authority
to pursue or decline particular situations or cases is believed to
promote the "human rights norm of receiving a fair trial" by securing
the independence of the Prosecutor, and is therefore "a crucial
element in determining the long-term legitimacy of the ICC."' 52
Thus, while the relative gravity of a particular crime may lead the
OTP to prosecute one case over another in one context, it may
legitimately be persuaded by other factors-practical considerations
such as the likelihood of apprehending a suspect or the availability of
evidence, or strategic considerations such as a desire to shed light on
the "complete landscape" of events that occurred within a particular
situation-in another context."53 At the same time, however, the
commentator cited above with regard to the OTP's different
approach in the Uganda and DRC situations is correct in observing
that the Lubanga case is "contradictory" to a number of statements
made by the OTP regarding the importance of gravity in the selection
of cases.'54 We therefore suggest that it would enhance the
legitimacy of the ICC if the OTP were to communicate as clearly as
possible which factors were in fact relevant to its decisions in each
context so that the public may more accurately evaluate those
decisions.
151. Danner, supra note 147, at 519-20 (citing Louise M. Arbour, Statement to
the Preparatory Commission on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, 1997 ICTY Y.B. 229, 232, U.N. Sales No. E.99.III.P.2).
152. Brubacher, supra note 56, at 84; see also Danner, supra note 147, at 515
("The Prosecutor's ability to make individualized considerations based on law and
justice, rather than the self-interest or sheer power of any particular state,
transforms the Court from a political body festooned with the trappings of law to a
legal institution with strong political undertones.").
153. See C6t, supra note 56, at 168 (noting that, in the context of the ICTY and
ICTR, Prosecutors have considered, as a matter of discretion, such factors as the
"prospect for arresting the suspect," the "sufficiency of the evidence available" and
how a case fits within a strategy of "highlighting the complete landscape of the
criminal acts perpetrated at the time").
154. El Zeidy, supra note 143, at 57.
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